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Abstract 
We examine whether stock market fully value intangible assets, especially R&D and 
Advertising expenses in a specific sample of firms: US net firms along eight years 
(1996 until 2003). We find that the market value-to-book increases when the return on 
equity is positive, but also rises as return on equity becomes more negative. We argue 
that the negative pricing is due the collision of large expenditures in R&D and 
Advertising that are subject to conservatism accounting practice. Our results are robust 
when compared with a sample of recent contemporaneous IPOs of US net firms. We are 
able to conclude that: i) investors look beyond aggregate earnings, ii) that investors 
value certain components of losses (R&D and Advertising expenditures) positively, iii) 
capital markets seem to give strong value to firms undertaking such investments, iv) and 
that the presence of growing R&D and Advertising expenditures, implies that the 
persistence of losses may have become a weaker indicator of likelihood of liquidation, v) 
when faced financial distressed, the mergers an acquisitions is the main strategy to 
exercise the growth option and maximize the value of the firm and vi) consequently 
analyse loss firms homogenous can lead incorrect specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the stock market value firms ultimately reflects the 
value of its net assets. When most of the assets are physical, such plant and equipments, 
the link between asset values and stock prices is relatively apparent. In modern 
economies, however, a large proportion of firms’ assets tend to be intangible, such as 
brand names (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 2001). 
Under the generally accepted U.S. accounting principles, many types of intangible 
assets are not reported in firms´ financial statements. When a firm has a large amount of 
such intangibles, the lack of accounting information complicates the task of equity 
valuation. One such type of intangible asset, business research and development (R&D), 
has lately been the subject of much attention. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) 
report that at the end of 1999, the technology sector and the pharmaceutical industry 
together accounted for roughly 40 percent of the value of the S&P 500. This interest in 
part reflects the recent widespread technological change, together with the dazzling 
growth of science and knowledge industries, which are especially active in R&D. The 
Internet industry is an interesting example because the rents provided by physical assets 
are viewed as tiny compared to those provided by intangible assets. In this sense, 
internet firms typify the increasingly important role that intangible plays in creating 
competitive advantage in today’s fierce global market. Their rapid and worldwide 
impact on business and communication is now seen by many as a revolution akin to that 
triggered by early innovations such moveable type, radio, the telephone, and the 
computer (Lev, 2000, 2001). 
The rise in the importance of technology-oriented companies, in particular 
internet firms, raises the question of whether their stock market value reflect their 
intangible R&D capital, particularly after the dot.com bubble – March 2000. These 
firms have few tangible assets. Their prospects are tied to the success of new, untested 
technologies and hence are highly unpredictable. Large expenditures are usually 
required at the outset, and the outcome of many research projects is far from assured. 
The benefits, if any, are likely to materialize much later in the life-cycle of the firm and 
the life-span of resulting products may be quite short. Under U.S. accounting standards, 
financial statements do not report intangible assets as R&D spending is expensed. As a 
result some yardsticks commonly used by investors, such as price-earnings ratios and 
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market-to-book ratios, may be misstated. We examine whether stock prices fully value 
intangible assets, especially R&D expenses. Our study adds to the emerging literature in 
accounting and finance that look at the relevance of conservatism accounting on the 
valuation of U.S. net firms (Demers and Lev, 2001; Jorion and Talmor, 2000; Rajogopal 
et al., 2002; Trueman et al., 2000, Keating, Lys and Magee, 2003) in several ways. First, 
we contrast simultaneously two types of samples: net firms and a selected sample of 
non-net firms that went public at the same time. The goal is to assess the degree to 
which prices of net firms and non-net firms are affected by the conservatism effect, i.e., 
the negative pricing affect both of samples. Second, we split both of samples in two 
dimensions: i) profit and loss firms because the literature shows that the information 
impact of earnings is substantially different if firms reporting profits and losses and, ii) 
in function of their business model, in order to better identify their value drivers. Third, 
we use longitudinal data (1996-2003). This data allow us to analyze this phenomenon 
before and after the crash of the dot.com bubble March - 2000. To the best of our 
knowledge this study covers a longer time span than previously published studies. Our 
results indicate that: i) investors look beyond aggregate earnings; ii)that investors value 
certain components of losses (R&D and Advertising expenditures) positively, i.e. as an 
asset; ii) and that the presence of growing R&D and Advertising expenditures, may 
imply that the persistence of losses has become a weaker indicator of likelihood of 
liquidation, in the opposition to the abandonment option theory. We conclude that when 
faced financial distressed, high-tech firms adopt a strategy of mergers and acquisitions 
in order to exercise their call option and maximize the firm´s value. In this context, 
characteristics of loss firms vary along vary dimensions. Treat loss firms homogenous 
can lead incorrect specifications. 
 
2. Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Pricing of Intangible-Intensive Firms 
 
2.1 Theory and empirical evidence on the pricing of intangible firms  
In the context of valuation, Modigliani and Miller (1966) discuss in their seminal paper 
how accounting earnings are a proxy for the expected unobservable earnings power of 
firms´ assets. They note that losses complicate the use of earnings-based valuation 
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models since a loss reduces the ability of reported earnings provide information about 
earnings power of firm´s assets1. 
 
In fact, the assumption that a loss is temporary is consistent with the abandonment 
option approach (Hayn, 1995). The abandonment option suggests shareholders of loss 
firms will redeploy or liquidate the assets of the firm if losses are persistent otherwise 
expected to continue (Hayn, 1995; Berger at al, 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1998). According the abandonment option, losses 
represent a case where current earnings signal future earnings will be sufficiently low so 
as to make the abandonment option attractive leading to investors to stop valuing the 
firm strictly on the basis of reported earnings. Empirically, Riffe and Thompson (1998) 
and Leibowitz (1999) observe differential pricing between positive and negative income. 
 
However, the frequency of firms reporting losses has markedly increased over the last 
three decades (Hayn, 1995; Collin, Maydew and Weiss, 1997; Collins, Pincus and Xie, 
1999; Francis and Shipper, 1999; Joos and Plesko, 2004). This increased in reported 
losses extends over periods of economic growth and prosperity suggesting that reported 
losses do not reflect financial distress equally across firms reporting losses. In fact, prior 
research also suggests that firms that report losses and invest heavily in intangible assets 
may not be financially distressed when ongoing losses are reported, especially in fast 
changing intangible industries (Amir and Lev, 1996; Lev and Zarowin, 1999, Lev, 2000,  
2001).  
 
As Aboody e Lev (2000) argue, the presence of intangible assts is the major source of 
information asymmetry between managers and outsiders, because: i) R&D projects are 
unique to the specific firms, therefore, it is hard to estimate the value of those projects 
by comparing them to similar projects of other firms, ii) there are no organized markets 
for R&D and therefore no asset prices from which to derive information (most physical 
and financial assets have organized marketplaces where price convey information about 
the value of productivity) and, iii) R&D is expensed on income statements, so no 
information regarding the value change is reported to investors (accounting rules require 
periodic recognition of value impairment for other investments). 
                                                 
1 Traditionally the investigations do not include firms reporting losses (see Beaver, Lambert, and Morse, 
1980; Collins, and Kothari, 1989 for example.).  
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As R&D and adverting are treated as expenses, under the U.S. GAAP, many types of 
intangible assets are not reported in the firms’ financial statements. This procedure 
reduces directly the profits and misstates the accounting book value of equity and asset 
values.  
 
Many contributions from the fields of finance, accounting and economics have focussed 
on the link between market value and intangible assets. However, there is a theoretical 
gap in much of this literature. The Feltham and Ohlson (1995) FOM model gives the 
capacity to identify the potential differences between market value of equity (MVE) and 
book value of equity (BVE) – the “unrecorded goodwill”. 
 
As pointed out by Ohlson (1995) OM, under unbiased accounting, in the long run, the 
expected value of goodwill, which accounts for the difference between the market value 
of equity and the book value of equity, converges to zero. Otherwise, if permanent 
abnormal operating income persist, the accounting system is conservative (biased)2.  
 
In an extension of the OM, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) demonstrated that the 
persistence of abnormal operating income can be the result of any combination of two 
factors. First, the conservatism can result from a systematic accounting undervaluation 
of existing operating assets. In this case, the reported book value of operating assets is 
lower than the present value of cash flows that will be generated by current and prior 
investments. The second source of bias results from an accounting reporting system3, in 
which the net present value of future investment projects is not reflected in the current 
financial statements. A typical example is the treatment of research and development 
expenditures, which in the present investigation is a proxy for growth opportunities. In 
this context, the current expenditures associated with future growth opportunities would 
be expensed as opposed to capitalized as an element of net operating assets at the end of 
the period. As a result, the actual net operating income for the period would be 
understated. In addition to the operating income effect, net operating assets would be 
understated because expenditures are not capitalized. In this context, the growth 
                                                 
2 The notion of “aggressive accounting” where the book value exceeds the market value is regarded by 
Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) as unrealistic. 
3 The accounting policy selection is exogenous to the OM and FOM. These models abstract away from 
the frictions due to asymmetric information (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
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opportunities bias associated with the failure to capitalize such expenditures would 
overstate the “true” abnormal operating income for the period. Summarizing, growth 
opportunities bias, is a consequence of the failure to capitalize the net present value of 
growth opportunities as an element of net operating assets (i.e. the present value of 
future cash flows of the investments in R&D and Advertising)4. 
 
If implemented, the capitalization of the expenditures (R&D and Advertising) would 
increase the net operating asset balance. The increased net operating balance associated 
with this effect would, in turn, increase the operating income for the period in which the 
capitalization takes place. If the annual depreciation is lower than the normal operating 
expenses attributed to the investment, the investment component of the growth 
opportunity would lead to higher abnormal earnings. 
 
Taking care of the conservatism effect, defined in FOM and also by Zhang (2000), 
annual expenditures on R&D and adverting represent a call on the underlying R&D and 
advertising growth option. The present value of such growth option (PVGO) could be 
determined as: 
 
PVGOr&d,adverting = Max [Et(X)- C, 0] 
 
Et(X) is the present value of future cash flows associated with R&D and Adverting 
growth opportunities; C, the exercise price, is the current expenditure on R&D and 
Advertising activities. However, such disclosure is not in conformance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, due to the timing and uncertainty surrounding the 
estimation of Et(X). However, if the sequential investment assumption is valid, then 
observing R&D and advertising expenditures is a clear signal that rational managers 
exercised the call option, which implied that PVGOr&d, advertiding>0. Consequently, the 
impact of an incremental dollar of R&D expenditure on equity value should be greater 
than one dollar5. In fact, Hugonnier, Morellec and Sundaresan (2005) in a general 
                                                 
4 Richardson and Tinaikar (2004) refer a second source of ex-post conservatism, commonly referred to as 
delayed recognition accounting. Unexpected negative news with an impact on future cash flows generated 
by the projects are usually reflected in the financial statements, but ignored if the news is positive. Basu 
(1997) carries out an empirical test of this type of conservatism. 
5 MacCallig (2003) and Joos and Plesko (2004) observed that the market apparently gives sufficient credit 
to past losers, who are spending heavily on R&D and advertising. Such firms probably face strong 
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equilibrium theory of lump model show that option value of waiting can severy erodes 
the value of the investment, even for moderate levels of risk aversion. The example 
given was technological investments in Internet Sector. 
 
As the current U.S. norms preclude the inclusion of intangible assets in the company’s 
books, R&D and advertising are treated as expenses. These “investments - investment 
losses” especially in high-tech firms in the start-up phase can persist for long periods 
without suggesting financial distress. In fact, the conservatism effect has more impact in 
growth firms, given the fact that the market is pricing (and the accounting systems 
ignores) the potential success of R&D projects (product innovation), growth of the 
market size (industry-based) and growth market shares (firm specific). In this context, 
our purpose is to analysing the impact of conservatism accounting in valuation in a 
specific industry - Internet, taking in account a firm´s business economics. That is losses 
will be negative priced when accounting in biased and intangible assets dominate he 
business strategy of a firm.  
 
2.2 The Pricing of Internet Firms 
Given the speed with which Internet firms arose, academic accounting and finance 
research into the economics of the Internet firms is itself very recent. We briefly 
summarize what we consider as the major papers in the literature. 
 
Cooper et al (2001) using ninety-five name changes to Internet –related “dot.com” 
names during 1998 and 1999, document a positive average stock price reaction to the 
announcement of a firms adding “.com” to its name. This effect produces cumulative 
abnormal returns on the order of seventy four percent for ten days surrounding the 
announcement day. The effect does not appear to be transitory in that there is no 
evidence of a postannoucement negative drift. Same results are obtained by Lee (2001). 
Lee (2001) shows that announcements of “.com” names changes are associated with 
significant increases in stock process and trading activity. Schultz and Zaman (2000) 
examine the acquisition and insider trading behaviour o Internet firms and from vantage 
point argue that managers of Internet Firms do not act as if they believe their stocks are 
irrationally overpriced. Schill and Zhou (2001) compare investors´ valuations of 
                                                                                                                                               
pressures to cut R&D and advertisings investments, in order to improve earnings at least in short term. 
Their reluctance to do so, may reflect their managers´ confidence that future prospects are not so black.  
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Internet carve-outs with those of the parent. They find several examples of parents 
whose value holding of carve-out Internet subs significantly violate the law-of-one- 
price by exceeding the market value of the entire parent over an extended period of time. 
Schwart and Moon (2000, 2001) apply real option and capital budgeting theory to value 
Internet firms. Meulbroek (2001) finds that, in contrast to insider selling in the general 
population of firms, sales in Internet-based companies do not produce excess stock 
returns, suggesting that market participants do not on average interpret managers´ sales 
as sign of overvaluation. Wysocki (1999) examines the cross-sectional and time-series 
determinants of message-posting volume on stock message boards on the Internet. 
Wysocki (1999) uses message-posting activity on The Motley Fool Stock chat boards to 
test Kim and Verrechia´s (1997) prediction on the relation between trading volume 
during announcement and the amount of investor private information prior to and 
during the earnings announcement. Demers and Lewellen (2003) examine the impact of 
IPO underpricing on website traffic, which is a direct measure of product market 
performance for internet firms. They find that we traffic in the month after the IPO is 
positively and significantly associated with initial returns, and the effect is economically 
significant. The results obtain by these authors also suggest that the marketing benefits 
of underpricing extend beyond the internet sector and the “hot issues market” of late 
1990s. 
 
Demers and Lev (2001) examine the value-relevance of the cash burn rate and the 
efficiency of business-to-consumer Internet Firms´ stock prices to web traffic data. They 
conclude that cash burn is significant value-driver, and that the reaction of Internet 
firms´ stock prices to new web traffic data is not entirely consistent with strong form 
market efficiency. Hand (2001) assesses the degree of similarities in the cross-sectional 
pricing of internet stocks during the tumultuous year of 2000. In addition to The 
accounting and web traffic factors, Hand (2001) explores two proxies for supply and 
demand forces, namely public float and the extent of short interest in its stocks. The 
main conclusions are: i) at the peak of Internet prices in March 2000 the market reward 
losses of web-traffic-intensive firms but did not reward profits, while after the peak the 
market reversed its view, rewarding profits but not losses and ii) there is no evidence 
that two proxies for supply and demand forces – the degree of public float and short 
interest – have been systematically value-relevant for Internet firms. Keating, Lys and 
Magee (2003) investigates de decline of 45% of the Internet Stock Index during the 
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Spring 2000. The objective of the investigation was to analyse if the decline of the 
prices was associated with new disclosures such earnings, analysts’ forecasts revisions 
and web-traffic measures or a “reassessment” by investors to prior pre-existing 
information. The results show that the decline was modestly associated with new 
disclosures. However post-decline prices are more significantly explain by 1999 annual 
data. 
 
Trueman et al (2001a) find that Internet analysts´ revenue forecasts are unsophisticated 
in two ways. First, their revenues forecast almost always underestimate actual revenues. 
Second, historical revenue growth has incremental predictive power over analysts´ 
forecasts. Trueman et al (2001b) observe persistent anomalies in Internet stock returns 
around quarterly earnings announcements. They find a general run-up in prices in the 
days prior to the earnings announcement, followed by a price reversal lasting for several 
days. The magnitude of the market-adjusted returns associated with these price 
movements exceeds eleven percent over ten day period, and can not be explained by 
earnings news disclosed or by changes in risk around the earnings announcements. In 
addition, Rajgopal et al (2003) conclude the network constitute an important intangible 
of such firms, that is not recognized in the financial statements. Based on Metacalfe´s 
law (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) they define network as visitors2-visitors and conclude 
that network effect created by web site traffic has substantial explanatory power for 
stock prices over and above traditional summary accounting measures such earnings 
and book value. They also show that network advantages are positively associated with 
one-year-ahead and two-year ahead earnings forecasts provided by analysts. When 
analysing if network advantages are endogenously determined by managerial actions, 
they found that part of the relevance of network effects stems from the presence of 
affiliated referral programs and higher media visibility.  
 
Demers and Lev (2001), Jorion and Talmor (2000), Rajgopal et al (2000), Trueman et al 
(2000c) and Core at al (2003) focus their analyses on the value-relevance of 
nonfinancial web traffic measures for Internet firms. While each study concludes that 
web traffic is value-relevant, Jorion and Talmor (2000) find that the value relevance of 
web traffic materially diminishes over the period February through June 2000. In fact, 
Core at al (2003) found mixed evidence for the hypothesis that a New Economy 
subperiod occurred in the late of 1990s in which the relation between equity value and 
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traditional financial variables differs from previous studies. The regression results show 
that the explanatory power of traditional financial variables decline in the New 
Economy subperiod for all subsamples used. They conclude that the New Economy 
period is not unusual to other subperiods. We can conclude that the majority of studies 
about Internet firms are concentrated in the period before the crash (March 2000), and 
main research question was try to identify the factors that explain the prices of such 
firms. The web traffic variables assumed a very important role, beside the argument that 
reflects better the chain value of these firms6.  
 
3. Data  
We compile our sample firm list from the Internet Stock List7. We start with a 
list of 242 firms quoted on the 27th July 2003. In order to control for survivor bias, we 
track the index on 6/3/2002 (286 firms), 2/21/2001 (382 firms), 3/24/2000 (354 firms) 
and 5/25/1999 (108 firms) as published in the Morgan & Stanley reports (the 
technology IPO yearbook – 8th and 7th edition, the B2B Internet report and the Internet 
company handbook). Our initial sample consists of 658 internet firms. Missing 
observations lead us to discard 24 firms. We also deleted 12 far outliers from our 
sample to preserve the dimension of the sample8. Following previous studies we cover 
the period 1996-2003 as the year 1996 is usually associated with the birth of the net 
firms (Copeland et al. 2000; Schultz e Zaman, 2001; Damodaran, 2001; Core et al. 
2003).  
 
ISDEX 6/27/2003 6/3/2002 2/21/2001 3/24/2000 5/25/1999 
Number of firms 
selected 
242 286 382 354 108 
 
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of Internet Stocks, see Ofek and Richardson (2001, 
2002). 
7 The Internet Stock List was compiled by Internet.Com. Currently, different internet stock indexes are 
available in http://www.bullsector.com/internet.html. 
8 Eviews computes two statistics: “inner fences” and “outer fences”. Inner fences are defined as the first 
quartile minus 1,5*IQR (interquartile range) and the third quartile plus 1,5*IQR. The data outside inner 
fences are known as outliers. To further characterize outliers, the Eviews also defines outer fences, as the 
first quartile minus 3,0*IQR and the third quartile plus 3,0*IQR. The data between inner and outer fences 
are defined near outliers, and those outside the outer fences are referred as far outliers. Analytically:  
“inner fence” = [1.ºQ-1.5*IQR; 3.ºQ+1.5*IQR] and “outer fence” = [1.ºQ-3*IQR; 3.ºQ+3*IQR] (Eviews, 
version 5.0, pp.397). 
 11
The data was obtained from Compustat Active and Research Files at the end of 
the fiscal year (see appendix A for description of the variables). Similarly to Core et al 
(2003), Hand (2001), we set the variables R&D and Advertising equal to zero, when 
their values are missing, with the goal of preserving the sample size. Contrarily to 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman (1998), Collins, Pincus and Xie (1999) and Joos and Plesko (2004) outside 
the universe of net firms and Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2001c) and Hand (2001) in 
the context of net firms, we include in our sample net firms with negative BVE9. 
According to Zhang (2000) firms may present a negative value for BVE in consequence 
of an aggressive conservatism effect, especially in a growth phase. Hence a negative 
coefficient on book value represents a need to adjustments in operating investment 
assets that are needed to generate the stream of expected future earning10.   
 
Assuming that the information impact of earnings varies between profit and 
losses reporting firms, as suggested by Hayn (1995), Chamber (1996) and 
Subramanyam and Wild (1996), and to take in account the heterogeneity of business 
models of internet firms, we split the sample of internet firms in four groups11,12: 
 
Internet firms Profit Group Loss Group 
R&D Profit_R&D Loss_R&D 
Advertising (Adv) Profit_Adv Loss_Adv 
 
If R&D investment is larger than advertising, the firm is considered an R&D 
firm.  
 
                                                 
9 Core et al (2003) observe that deleting firms with negative book value of equity removes a greater 
percentage of young (7,5%) and high-technology firms (5,6%). 
10 Amir and Lev (1996), Penamn (1998) and Francis and Shipper (1999) obtain for certain years, a 
negative coefficient in the variable BVE. They considered this result hard to interpret.  
11 The Morgan &Stanley in the: “The technology IPO yearbook” – 8th and 7th edition subdivided the 
internet sector in eleven sub sectors: 1) internet portal, 2) internet commerce, 3) internet infrastructure, 4) 
internet B2B software, 5) internet financial services, 6) vertical portal, 7) internet infrastructure services, 
8) internet consulting & application, 9) Internet advertising & direct marketing services, 10) B2B 
commerce e 11) multi-sector internet companies. However, partition of the sample in these eleven sub-
sectors was not possible due the small number of observations for some sub sectors. 
12 We identify the group R&D with the Business-to-Business internet firms (B2B) and the advertising 
sample with the Business-to-Consumer internet firms (B2C). 
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 In order to control: i) the effect dot.com bubble documented by Cooper et al 
(2001), Lee (2001) and Bartov Mohanram and Sethamraju (2002) and ii) the cluster 
effect of IPOs in time documented by Ljungvisq and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and 
Ritter (2003) among others, we selected a match sample of contemporaneous IPOs of 
net firms – non net firms sample 13 . A match sample allows us to guarantee the 
robustness of our results.  For this sample we adopt the same partition as for the net 
firms’ sample. In figure 1 we can observe the number of IPOs under the period by 
scrutiny in both of samples. 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
3.1 Characteristics of our samples 
Before 1996, few net initial public offerings (10.93 percent) took place. Out of a 
total of 622 net firms’ offerings, 33.76 percent left the market. However, a generalized 
failure can not be inferred from this evolution as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were 
the main abandonment form. Only 1.43 percent of firms went bankrupt. Opler and 
Titman (1995) and Fluck and Lynch (1999) consider mergers of distressed firms (89.05 
percent of net firms that left the market reported losses in the last independent year) as a 
means of avoiding the undesirable outcomes resulting from the declaration of 
bankruptcy. The exercise of the growth option via merger enables the firm to maximize 
its value, allowing the continued utilization of the distressed firm’s current business 
technologies, subsequent to the merger, and the bundle of assets to be kept intact14.  
[Insert table 1] 
In table 2, we conclude that is much higher the number of non net firms IPOs 
before 1996 (24,63%). However, in both sample that is clearly the effect of cluster in 
the time of IPOs in the period of the dot.com bubble (69,30% in the net firms and 
50,28% in non net firms – see also figure one). The M&A is the principal strategy to 
leave the market in both samples, but the percentage of the firms that left the market 
with profits in non net firms is much higher (36,24%) than in the sample of net firms 
(only 10,95%).  
[Insert table 2] 
                                                 
13 We are grateful to Darren Hawkins, of NASDAQ International Department in supply the data sample 
of the IPO that occurred in NASDAD between 1990 and 2002. 
14 As the specific nature of the majority of tech firms’ assets renders their residual value very low (Berger, 
Ofek and Swary, 1996), liquidation is not an attractive strategy. The adaptation potential of these assets is 
also reduced (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 
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In table 3, we report that 517 (of a total of 622) net firms are classified in high 
tech sectors, following the standard definitions used by Collins, Maydew and Weiss 
(1997), Francis and Schipper (1999) and Loughran and Ritter (2003). The percentage of 
non net firms is half (47,69%). In this context, it is reasonable to assume that the highest 
value used of the intangible and firm-specific assets of the distressed firms is internally 
generated, enabling the continued use of the firm’s current business technologies within 
the post merger entity. The growth options generated by R&D and Advertising provide 
a lower bound to the future abnormal earnings produced by the merger entity.  
[Insert table 3] 
 
As we can observe in table 4, besides the highly asymmetrically distribution of 
the variables, the mean of the ratio R&D/Sales over the period 1996 through 2003 in the 
net firms sample is 53% (the median is 15%). For non net firms the value for the mean 
is much higher 157%, but the median value of this ratio is only 4%. 
[Insert table 4] 
 In Table 5 we split the sample in profit and loss firms. We find no 
statistically significant differences related to the mean and median of the variables R&D 
and ADV between the profit (20 percent) and loss (80 percent) making firms. However 
when we analyse the median of the ratio R&D over sales, the difference is statistically 
significant throughout the period under scrutiny15. The investment in R&D (intangible 
assets) in the loss group is 18.5 percent of sales totalling 33.75 millions of dollars 
(median values), while in the profit group the investment in R&D is 3.3 percent for a 
larger sales volume of 98.53 millions of dollars (median values). Loss making firms are 
the ones that invest heavily in intangible assets, in an attempt to appropriate the benefits 
arising from the “winner-takes-all-business” strategy proposed by Noe and Park (2001). 
These authors developed a model in which web-based firms (net firms) spend 
profligately on advertising and R&D while generally making losses. The rationality of 
their model is based on the winner-takes-all structure of high-fixed costs, low-marginal 
costs, markets for information goods. These competitive strategies generate returns that 
are highly positively skewed, following a Pareto-like distribution. In addition, since 
large expenditures in the first period produce valuable growth options in later periods, 
which are treated as expenses using traditional accounting rules, the financial valuation 
                                                 
15 Due the fact that the distribution of the variables is very asymmetrical, we concentrated the analyses in 
the median values. 
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of internet firms, may actually be negatively related to performance using standard 
accounting measures of profitability, that fail to capitalize these opportunities. 
[Insert table 5] 
For the sample of non net firms the results are quite similar (table 6). The 
differences related to the median of almost variables are statically significant. Related to 
the ratio R&D/sales the loss group of firms (45,5%) has the same behaviour of the net 
firms. These firms is invest heavily in R&D (the ratio R&D/sales is 17,6%)) when sales 
totalling 33,53 millions of dollars (median values). The profit group (54,5% of non net 
firms) with 103,8 millions of dollars in sales invest a residual value in this ratio. It is 
also important to notice that for both samples the market value of equity is higher than 
for loss group under all period. 
[Insert table 6] 
Interestingly is even the crash (March 2000), reflected in the decreasing of the 
market value of equity, the firms especially the loss group, continue to invest heavily in 
the R&D, as predicted by the model of Noe and Park (2000). 
 
[Insert figure 2, 3] 
[Insert figure 4 and 5] 
 
 
Based on theses preliminary results, i.s. the partner of the behaviour of the 
variables R&D and MVE, we can conclude that the conservatism effect has more 
impact in growth high-tech firms. 
 
 Next, we test the significance of changes overtime by regressing each 
characteristic on annual time trend t, and report in the last column of the table, the 
significance level of the coefficient estimated for t. We use O.L.S. to test for trends in 
means and medians regressions. 
 [Insert table 7] 
 For sample of net firms, the age augmented over the period. The increase in 
revenues is accompanied by the investment in R&D, which is reflected in the ratio 
R&D/sales. The variable liabilities – total also increase over the period. Interesting is 
the fact that the trend of the variable assets is only significant at 10% level, which mean 
that the majority of assets in these type of firms are intangibles assets. About the ratio 
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MVE/BVE16 it is important to notice that it reach the maximum in 1999, but this 
evolution is not statistically significant. Again, the strategy in continue to invest, 
particularly in intangible assets even the decrease of market value after 2000 and the 
persistence of negative earnings. 
[Insert table 8] 
Establish the comparison with the sample of non net firms, we observe that the 
level of significance of the variables are much higher than in the sample of net firms, 
but the pattern of evolution is quite similar. Even the increase in revenues over the 
period the earnings remain negative, but the value is less than in net firms. The 
investment in R&D and in assets has statistically significance. Interesting is notice that 
the liabilities increase at the same time the long term debt, contrary to the net firms. 
 
 These results are consistent with the model proposed by Noe and Park (2000), 
which suggest that high-tech firms invest heavily in intangible assets in order to 
generate valuable growth options in the future (in our samples the majority of the firms 
are classified in high-tech sectors). This strategy is a clearly signal to the market that the 
managers exercise de call if it is in the money. Recall that the percentage of bankruptcy 
in both samples is residual comparing with the strategy of M&A.  
 
3.2. The standard Ohlson (1995) model and hypotheses 
Ohlson (1995) derives the following valuation model (OM) based on the 
standard assumptions underlying the dividend discount model, the clean surplus relation 
(CSR), and an assumed stochastic process for abnormal returns17: 
tv2
a
tx1tbvtP α+α+=    (1) 
where Pt is the stock price at time t, bvt is end-of-year book value of equity and xat  is 
abnormal earnings for period t, and vt is other non-accounting value-relevant 
                                                 
16 In the calculation of the ratios, especially the ratio MVE/BVE we follow the methodology suggest by 
Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001): we aggregate separately the items in the numerator and 
denominator. The virtual of this procedure (compared to calculate the average of he ratios across firms) is 
that it is insensitive to outliers cases where a firm has very low or no earnings, for example.  
17 The OM is based on the well-known residual income valuation model (Preinreich, 1938 and Edwards 
and Bell, 1961) and is defined as tv
a
txtbvtP 21 αα ++= , where 0)(1 >−= wfR
wα , 0))((2 >= −− γα ff FRwR R , 
a
tx - abnormal earnings, bvt is the book value of equity and vt other non-accounting information. The 
goodwill is attributed to abnormal earnings ( )∑∞= +−=− 1τ ττ atxfRtbvtP . 
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information, which is assumed to be independent of net income and book-value of 
equity. Substituting the abnormal earnings in the above equation, the price can be 
expressed as a function of current period earnings and book value at time t, lagged book 
value (i.e. bvt-1), and other information, we obtain: 
itt,i21it10it eNIBVEMVE +α+α+α= −   (2) 
Where MVE is market value of equity, BVE is the book value of equity and NI 
the net income18. Notice that we delete the unspecified “other information” variable (vt), 
and replace it with an intercept an error term. The intercept allows for nonzero mean 
pricing effects of the omitted other information, which becomes part of the error term19.  
This version of the OM is appropriate for our study as we also intend analyse the 
relationship price-losses (current losses) which is a consequence of an aggressive 
conservatism accounting, especially in growth phase. Notice that the media and median 
of age in net firms samples is 4,36 and 4 years respectively, and in non net firms sample 
the values are quite similar (4,79 years for media and 4 yearns for median) .  
We use beginning-of-year as opposed to end-of-year book value in equity 
valuation (2), because under the clean surplus relationship, current earnings are 
including as part of end-of-period book value. If we used BVEt instead of BVEt-1, 
earnings would effectively appear on the right-hand side of equation twice (the first 
time as an independent variable, the second time as part of the independent variable 
BVEt). Given the “scale-effect” underlined by Easton and Sommers (2003), we apply 
the logarithmic transformation to the variable MVE20,21.  
In line with Fama and MacBeeth (1973), we base our inferences on the average 
of slopes from the regressions estimated separately for each year from 1996 to 2003. 
                                                 
18 As Francis and Schipper (1999) we assume that market value and intrinsic values follow the same 
construct.  
19 Recall that the variable vt, aggregate other value relevant events that have not yet been incorporated in 
financial statements. According to Ohlson (1995:668), vt is assumed to be independent of NI and BVE. If 
this assumption is correct, the omission of this term from our empirical model will not affect the 
estimated coefficients on earnings and lagged book value. 
20We did not scale both the variables (dependent and independent) by the variable BVE, because we 
intended to include also the firms with negative BVE. We excluded the variable “sales” and “total assets 
– TA”, due the fact most of the start-up internet firms have low value for sales and the investments are 
concentrated in intangible assets. In this context, as pointed by Fama and French (1998), scaling the 
variables by sales or TA augmented the influence of influential observations – outliers. We also excluded 
the lagged MVE, due to the high valuation of these firms, especially during the “dot.com bubble” period 
of 1999 and 2000. The number of shares is not used due to the effect of look-up period, as pointed out by 
Ofek and Richardson (2002, 2003). 
21 With this transformation we change the distribution of the dependent variable, but when observe the 
Jarque-Bera and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we conclude that the distribution is normal. It allows us to 
use the OLS method in estimating regressions. See also appendix B. 
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The objective is to analyse if the market prices differently earnings and book value, the 
primary value indicators, according to OM, as the internet sector/net firms matures. 
Thus equation (2) takes the following form: 
1,2..NiforeFααMVE it
H
1j
tj,i,tj,0it =++= ∑
=
    (3) 
where Fi,j,t is the explanatory factor j for firm i in year t, H is the number of explanatory 
variables, N is the number of firms. The null hypothesis that the average of year-by-year 
regression slopes is zero. That is 
T,...2,1tfor0
T
H
T
1t
jt
0 ==
α
=
∑
=   (4) 
According, Fama and French (1998) the advantages of this approach are: i) the 
year-by-year variation in the slopes includes the effects of estimation error due to the 
cross correlation of the residuals of individual firms and22 ii) other great advantage is to 
work with a large samples per annual regressions, which increases the precision of the 
slopes and reduces their year-by-year volatility. In fact, the survivor bias is a very 
important factor that we need to control in the Internet sector. 
 
Early studies that analyze value relevance (statistical dependence between the 
financial statement measures (earnings, book value of equity) and the market 
assessment of firm value of losses) conclude that the in formativeness of earnings varies 
between profit and loss making firms (Hayn, 1995; Chambers, 1996). Profits are 
regarded as enjoying stronger information content than losses, in equity valuation. 
Losses are considered less informative due to their transitory nature or the shift in 
importance from earnings toward liquidation values when large and lasting losses are 
reported. Recent studies assume that some losses may be related to investment, rather 
than value destruction. McCallig (2003) shows that loss-making firms in the 1970s 
reported losses for shorter periods of time and were similar to profit making firms than 
the firms in the 1990s. Joos and Plesko (2004) contend that as the income statements of 
young firms are likely to be distorted by large investments in intangible assets, the 
reported losses are not a good predictor for future performance. Our first hypothesis (H1) 
is: 
H1: Earnings (negative) will have a negative association with market value. 
                                                 
22 We correct standard errors using the Newey and West (1987) adjustments, with six lags, for serial 
correlation dependence in coefficients, following Core et al. (2003). 
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 Formally this implies estimation of the following equation: 
itit10it eNIMVE +α+α=      (5) 
Where the variables are as described earlier. 
In order to investigate if the negative pricing of losses is caused by an omitted 
correlated variable23, or more specifically, the simple earnings capitalization model is 
misspecified due to the omission of the variable BVE, as pointed out by Collins, Pincus 
and Xie (1999), our second hypothesis (H2) is that: 
 
H2: BVE is positively related to MVE. 
 
The positive association between the variable BVE and MVE for both profit and 
loss firms is sustained on the assumption that if negative earnings cause investors to 
assess a higher probability that a firm will abandon its resources, the variable BVE 
provides value relevant information on abandonment value for firms most likely to be 
liquidated (i.e. the abandonment option approach as sustained by Hayn, 1995; Berger, 
Ofek and Swary, 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 
1998); and if current losses are a consequence of large investments in intangible assets, 
then the book value, in line of OM, can be a good proxy for expected future normal 
earnings. Book value conveys information on the funding available to continue 
investments in these firms. According to Collins, Pincus and Xie (1999), the coefficient 
on earnings should capture the direct effect of earnings in the price, and the coefficient 
on the end-of-period book value would capture the indirect effect of earnings on stock 
prices through its effect on end-of-year book value. This hypothesis is empirically 
examined by estimating model (6): 
itt,i21it10it eNIBVEMVE +α+α+α= −    (6) 
In general, investment in intangible assets has two effects on earnings: the 
expensing in the current period reduces earnings, but revenues generated from past 
investment in intangible assets simultaneously increase earnings. In early stages of 
development (start up phase) current period expensing of investments in intangible 
                                                 
23 According to Greene (2000), when a relevant variable is positively correlated with the dependent 
variable and negative (positively) correlated with the included variable, omitting the relevant variable, 
will induce a negative (positive) bias in the coefficient of the included variable. 
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assets dominates current period revenue generation. Thus the overall effect is to reduce 
reported earnings. However, we expect the market to value expensing in intangibles 
positively. Frazen (2000) provides evidence in this direction. She finds that markets 
value positively research expenses of loss making firms. Joos and Plesko (2004) also 
show that investors reward the research component of loss making firms with positive 
returns. Sougiannis (1994) shows that total research investments are positively valued 
by the market, and that the investment value of research is reflected in earnings. He 
finds that the information related to research that is conveyed in earnings (before 
research expenses) is valued more than the information conveyed by total research 
expenses. Based on these arguments and in our preliminary results that show that both 
of firms invest heavily in intangible assets in order to generate valuable growth options 
in the future, our third hypothesis (H3) is: 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between investment in research and advertising and 
market value of firms. 
 
 Formally this is equivalent to the following equation: 
itit3it21t,i10it eRDRD_NIBBVEMVE +α+α+α+α= −   (7) 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we disaggregate the variable NI (NIB_RB 
represents earnings before research expenses and RD represents research and 
development expenses). We also estimate the following equation: 
itit3it21t,i10it eADVADV_NIBBVEMVE +α+α+α+α= −    (8) 
where NIB_ADV represents  earnings before advertising expenses and ADV represents 
advertising expenses. If R&D and advertising expenditures are seen by the market as 
proxies for future growth opportunities then they can pick up information about 
expected profits missed by the current earnings. To test this hypothesis, we adjust the 
variable earnings to the items R&D and Advertising24. 
 
4. Results 
                                                 
24  Sougiannis (1994), Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) argue that like R&D, advertising 
expenditures have some elements of long-term investments (although the effective lifetime of advertising 
expenditures may be comparatively shorter). 
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We examine the relevance of our hypotheses by estimating equations 5-8 
through ordinary least squares regressions as suggested by Fama and McBeth (1973). 
To test hypothesis 1 we regress MVE on net income. We use income before 
extraordinary items (NI_BE) as a proxy for comprehensive income, which is the 
measure of income under the clean surplus relation in OM. Table 9 reports the results.  
[Insert table 9] 
For loss net firms (as for all years), the mean coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance 25 . Moreover, the negative 
coefficient is robust when we substitute income before extraordinary items for bottom 
line earnings (not reported results)26. In line with previous findings the value relevance 
of earnings increases with their persistence. In fact, the adjusted R-squared is much 
higher (31.25 percent against 12.05percent) for profit net firms than for loss making 
firms. Notice that the coefficient of loss group is -0.011 which imply that the MVE of 
this group increases 1.1%27.  
[Insert table 10] 
 When we compare the results with the results obtain for the sample of non net 
firms, the results are quite similar. The coefficient on income before extraordinary items 
is also negative, which means that the MVE increases 1.16% with losses. However, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. As we expected, the explanatory of earnings 
increase with their persistence. In fact, in profit group the adjusted R- squared is much 
higher (37.17% against 10.30% in loss group). ). Based on these results we do not reject 
H1. 
In order to evaluate if the negative pricing of losses is due to the effect of a 
correlated omitted variable as suggested by Collins, Pincus and Xie (1999), we analyze 
the matrix of correlations for profit and loss making firms in both samples (Table 11). 
The correlation between MVE, BVE, NI an NI_BE for profit and loss making firms 
differs in statistically terms in both samples. However, the correlation is positive and 
                                                 
25 An analysis of yearly regressions reveals the presence of heterocedasticity for some years as indicated 
by the White (1980) statistic (details not shown). For these years, we correct standard errors based on 
White test which assume that the heterocedasticity form is unknown. For years 2001, 2002 and 2003 the 
normality assumption is rejected under the test of Jarque-Bera, but was accepted according the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
26 The adjusted R2 when we regress model (5) for the sample of net firms using the bottom line earnings 
is 27.68% for the profit group and 11.98% for the loss group. In the sample of non net firms the values 
are: 33.95% and 9.48% for profit and loss group respectively 
27 Note that the values of earnings will all non-positive. A positive coefficient on this variable suggests 
that MVE is lower for firms with larger losses, while a negative coefficient suggests the opposite. 
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statistically significant for the variables MVE, R&D and ADV in both samples and both 
groups, which suggest that these variables are good proxies for future growth options. 
[Insert table 11] 
In Table 12 we estimate model 6 for the net firm sample. When we introduce the 
variable BVE in the model, the variable NI_BE turns out to be negative but not 
significant at a statistically meaningful level. In other words, the omission of the 
variable BVE induces a negative bias in the coefficient on earnings for loss firms in 
equation.  
[Insert figure 6] 
Notice also, that the adjusted R2 rises substantially from a level that is 12 percent 
when BVE is excluded from the model for loss making firms (Table 9) to about 27 
percent when BVE is included. BVE thus has a substantial incremental explanatory 
power, beyond earnings, in equity valuation for loss firms. As demonstrated by the OM, 
BVE is a proxy for expected future normal earnings. The variable BVE conveys 
information on the funding available to continue investments in loss firms. As expected, 
for profit making firms there is only a small increase in the explanatory power of the 
regressions when BVE is added to the earnings capitalization model (31.25 percent to 
38.27 percent). For these firms, the most important value driver is earnings. The results 
are similar when we regress the model 6 on the sample of non net firms. Based on these 
results we do not reject H2.  
[Insert table 12 and 13] 
In equation 6 the intercepts are significant and positive, for both samples and 
both groups of firms. This is consistent with other value-relevant information with 
positive pricing effects being excluded from the empirical model. Pricing effects would 
be positive, for example, for unrecorded assets having earnings effects that are not fully 
recognized in current earnings (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1998).  
In order to empirically test H3, we regress MVE on earnings before R&D and 
advertising for both groups of firms in both of samples. As expected, R&D expenses are 
relevant for loss making firms. The coefficient α3 assume the value 0.016 and 0.029 in 
net and non net firms respectively and is positive and statistically significant at 5%. We 
could interpret this result as the investors pricing theses variables as assets besides the 
U.S. GAAP treat theses items as expenses. Capital markets seem to give strong value to 
the firms that undertaking such investments. The variable earnings adjusted by R&D, 
remains negative but not statistically significant only in the loss net firms. In profit 
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groups, this variable besides not statistically significant has a negative coefficient, 
which could indicate for that group, and in line with the results of Souginnais (1994) 
that market reward that variable as an expense. 
[Insert table 14 and 15] 
 For model 7, we were able to estimate only the model for the net loss firms due 
to the smaller number of firms in the profit group. ADV is priced positively as an asset. 
The variable earnings adjusted for advertising expenses remains negative, but not 
statistically significant. The asymmetry across loss and profit making firms in valuation 
of R&D and ADV leads us to believe that the earnings and BVE are likely to vary 
overtime, as the firms evolve and mature. For profitable firms the relation between price 
and earnings is positive and not largely affected by current expenses originated by 
intangible investments. Earnings are the most important value driver for healthy firms 
as the OM predicts but not for loss making firms. 
[Insert table 16 and 17] 
In order to assess the validity of our results before and after the dot.com bubble (March, 
2000) we estimated all regressions for periods before and after the crash. Chow tests 
that compare the stability of the regressions are reported in table 18. As it can be 
observed the regressions show a structural break in only one set of regressions (profit-
making non-net firms). 
[Insert table 18] 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
We analyze the value relevance of intangibles in the net industry for a newly 
assembled data set for the period 1996-2003.  Unlike previous findings we show that 
earnings have a divergent influence on market value of profit and loss making firms due 
the collision of large expenditures in R&D and Advertising that are subject to the 
conservatism accounting practice. We find that book value of equity has a similar 
influence on both groups of firms. Market also values negatively expenditures in 
research and development in firms that report profits but values positively expenditures 
in both research and development and advertising in loss reporting firms. The 
robustness of theses results is confirmed when compared with contemporaneous IPOs of 
net firms and submitted the data to the fixed effects, in order to control the cross section 
effect, due the effect reputation and dimension of some firms (see for example Rajgopal 
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et al,2003 and Demers and Lev, 2001) and the dot.com bubble effect (time effect)28. The 
results suggest: i) that investors look beyond earnings, ii) value positively certain 
components of losses (R&D and Advertising), iii) standard earnings models may not be 
appropriate for valuing high-tech firms, especially the loss making firms at the early 
stage of development due the aggressive conservatism accounting effect faced by these 
firms; iv) the strategy of growing investments in R&D and Advertising due the 
persistence of losses implies that the persistence of losses may have become a weaker 
indicator of likelihood of liquidation in opposition of the abandonment option, v) when 
faced financial distressed, the mergers and acquisitions is the mains strategy followed 
by these firms in order to exercise the growth option and maximize the firm value, vi) 
consequently analyse loss firms homogenous can lead incorrect specifications. In order 
to draw further conclusions it would be desirable to compare the value relevance of 
intangibles across different industries and across different business cycles.  
                                                 
28 The results are available from the authors. 
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Fig.1 The number of IPOs by Internet firms and Non Internet firms by year 
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Fig.2 Evolution of the ratio R&D/sales (median) over the sample period in the net firms 
set 
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Fig.4 Evolution of the ratio R&D/sales (median) over the sample period in the non net 
firms set 
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Fig.5 Evolution of the MVE (median) over the sample period in the non net firms set 
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Fig. 6 The relationship between coefficients estimates before and after control for the 
effect of the variable BE I non net and net firms sample respectively 
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TABLE 1 
The sample: Net Firms  
Date of the 
IPO 
Global 
sample 
Partition of the sample N.º of IPO 
by year 
% IPO Results reported by the 
firms at the date of go out 
the market  
Reason for leaving the market  
  Profit Loss   Losses Profits Total M&A Bankruptcy Liquidation Private Other 
 
≤ 1996 71 34 
(48%) 
37 
(52%) 
68 10.93% 0 0 0      
1997 115 49 
(43%) 
66 
(57%) 
49 7.88% 0 0 0      
1998 154 47 
(31%) 
107 
(69%) 
56 9.00% 2 2 4 4     
1999 430 80  
(19%) 
350 
(81%) 
279 44.86% 12 1 13 12 1    
2000 527 74 
(14%) 
453 
(86%) 
152 24.44% 37 4 41 39    2 
2001 428 36 
(8%) 
392 
(92%) 
7 1.13% 59 9 68 60 1 2  5 
2002 367 54 
(15%) 
313 
(85%) 
3 0.48% 34 2 36 30  3  3 
2003 307 101 
(33%) 
206 
(67%) 
1 0.16% 43 5 48 34 1 4 2 7 
Without 
date of IPO 
   7 1.13%         
Total 2399   622  187 
(89.05%
) 
23 
(10.95%
) 
210 179 
(85.24%) 
3 
(1.43%) 
9 
(4.29%) 
2 
(0.95%) 
17 
(8.10%) 
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TABLE 2 
The sample: Non Net Firms  
Date of the 
IPO 
Global 
sample 
Partition of the sample N.º of IPO 
by year 
% IPO Results reported by the firms 
at the date of go out the 
market  
Reason for leaving the market  
  Profit Loss   Losses Profits Total M&A Bankruptcy Liquidation Private Other 
 
≤ 1996 143 81 (57%) 62 (43%) 143 26,43% 2 0 2 2     
1997 191 109 (57%) 82 (43%) 60 11,09% 1 2 3 3     
1998 212 120 (57%) 92 (43%) 52 9,61% 7 2 9 9     
1999 356 182 (51%) 174 (49%) 153 28,28% 14 11 25 20 1   4 
2000 445 195 (44%) 250 (56%) 119 22,00% 19 13 32 24 4   4 
2001 402 140 (35%) 262 (65%) 5 0,92% 16 9 25 22   1 2 
2002 374 145 (39%) 229 (61%) 4 0,74% 16 7 23 17   2 4 
2003 336 146 (43%) 190 (57%) 0 0,0% 20 10 30 25    5 
Without date 
of IPO 
   5 1) 0,92%         
Total 2459   541  95 
(63,76%
) 
54 
(36,24%
) 
149 122 
(81,88%
) 
5 
(3,36%) 
0 
(0,00%) 
3 
(2,01%) 
19 
(12,75%) 
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Table 3 
Partition of both samples by sector of activity 
 (SIC – Standard Industrial Code) Net Firms Non Net Firms 
  Total %4) Total %4) 
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 1) 1 0,16% 22 4,07% 
2836 Biological Products (No Diagnostic Substances) 1)   17 3,14% 
3576 Computer Communication Equipment1) 17 2,73% 6 1,11% 
3577 Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC1) 2 0,32% 8 1,48% 
3661 Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus1) 13 2,09% 10 1,85% 
3663 Radio & Tv Broadcasting & Communications Equipment1) 10 1,61% 8 1,48% 
3674 Semiconductors & Related Devices 3) 7 1,13% 33 6,10% 
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments3)   8 1,48% 
4812 Radiotelephone Communicatio”ns1) 3 0,48% 9 1,66% 
4813 Telephone Communications (No Radiotelephone) 3) 24 3,86% 18 3,33% 
4832 Radio Broadcasting Stations 1),2) 2 0,32% 9 1,66% 
4841 Cable & Other Pay Television Services2)   9 1,66% 
4899 Communications Services, NEC1),2) 7 1,13% 6 1,11% 
5961 Retail-Catalog & Mail-Order Houses1) 31 4,98%   
7370 Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, etc3) 183 29,42%   
7371 Services-Computer Programming Services3) 8 1,29%   
7372 Services-Pre-packaged Software3) 160 25,72% 68 12,57% 
7373 Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design1),3) 34 5,47% 14 2,59% 
7374 Services-Computer Processing & Data Preparation3) 2 0,32%   
7389 Services-Business Services, NEC 1) 13 2,09%   
8731 Services-Commercial Physical & Biological Research3)   13 2,40% 
 Total 517 83,12% 258 47,69% 
Classification by “high tech sector” according: 
1) Collins, Maydew e Weiss (1997); 
2) Francis e Shipper (1999); 
3) Loughran e Ritter (2003); 
4) Percentage of firms based in the total sample. 
 The total of net firms – 622 is distributed by 74 sectors; the non net firms are distributed by 158  sectors.  
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TABLE 4  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables in the net firms data set 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Age 4.38 4.00 14.00 0.00 1.58 1.90 9.45 
Sales 144.61 45.09 13,892.60 -2.62 498.64 19.05 492.21 
Assets 365.20 90.80 30,185.00 0.03 1,425.66 12.66 202.13 
NI_BE -74.59 -15.97 447.18 -4,961.30 293.49 -9.16 107.15 
LT 175.96 21.56 24,130.92 0 1,023.31 15.16 277.20 
LTD 52.18 0.19 6,497.00 0 276.75 12.15 209.64 
RD 14.42 4.70 1,049.00 -106.90 43.78 13.19 250.56 
ADV 4.82 0.023 321.40 -0.70 17.42 7.71 86.94 
BVE 257.21 80.95 21,586.10 -1,203.70 826.61 12.79 250.03 
MVE/BVE -1.212.53 2.12 44,177.40 -2,906,59 60,004.31 -48.40 2,343.89 
LT/Assets 0.48 0.27 105.15 0 2.50 35.88 1,407.50 
RD/Sales 0.53 0.15 127.07 -2.10 4.12 24.35 680.25 
ADV/Sales 0.11 0.001 28.57 -0.12 0.70 29.89 1,162.04 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of variables in the non net firms data set 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Age 4,79 4 13 1 2,04 1,13 4,26 
Sales 166,63 61,11 4.819 0,02 340,64 6,27 58,54 
Assets 336,19 108,73 24.961,8 0,24 1.145,64 15,37 289,58 
NI_BE -17,67 -0,94 276,05 2.251 96,70 -11,16 191,95 
LT 208,64 29,20 22.292 0 1.014,29 16,86 334,02 
LTD 109,82 1,35 18.671 0 782,35 18,27 385,71 
RD 11,54 1,7 279,98 0 24,74 4,83 36,42 
ADV 3,31 0 5.271 0 107,39 48,95 2.401,7 
BVE 139,69 63,82 4.039,5 -515,6 283,33 6,47 60,30 
MVE/BVE 4,09 1,96 7.057,30 -3.544,20 162,66 29,46 1.560,34 
LT/Assets 0,45 0,36 4,86 0 0,37 2,9 22,74 
RD/Sales 1,57 0,04 1.109,9 0 24,84 39,29 1.686,90 
ADV/Sales 0,06 0 60,09 0 1,36 38,07 1.680,10 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of variables are based on panel data over the period 1996 until 2003. The 
variables are in millions of dollars unless ratios. Age is the number of the years of the firm after go public. 
For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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TABLE 5 
Differences between means and medians in net firms sample: profits firms and losses firms (the variables are in millions of dollars, unless ratios)  
PANEL A: Means† 
          Variables 
 
Period 
N Age MVE  BVE  NI_BE  Sales  RD  ADV  RD/ 
Sales 
 ADV/ 
Sales 
 
1996: Profit 
           Losses 
34 
37 
1.75 
1.53 
480.5 
145.8 
** 86.2 
26.8 
* 11.09 
-14.7 
** 205.6 
24.46 
** 5.06 
4.12 
ns 0.17 
0.70 
ns 0.075 
4.402 
ns 0.004 
0.052 
* 
1997: Profit 
           Losses 
49 
66 
2.23 
1.95 
583.9 
244.9 
* 89.9 
40.4 
* 12.98 
-20.7 
** 183.9 
46.2 
** 7.79 
5.10 
ns 1.31 
1.41 
ns 0.069 
1.223 
ns 0.008 
0.063 
* 
1998: Profit 
           Losses 
47 
107 
2.27 
2.72 
469.4 
610.8 
ns 90.9 
81.2 
ns 12.77 
-27.3 
** 194.1 
62.8 
** 8.69 
7.58 
ns 2.56 
2.16 
ns 0.065 
0.671 
ns 0.016 
0.097 
* 
1999: Profit 
           Losses 
80 
350 
2.61 
1.63 
4,055.5 
2,184.1 
* 181.6 
144.8 
ns 18.35 
-42.4 
** 210.8 
59.5 
** 11.6 
6.19 
** 5.12 
4.14 
ns 0.07 
0.798 
ns 0.025 
0.298 
ns 
2000 Profit 
           Losses 
74 
453 
3.07 
2.13 
1,207.5 
644.4 
* 259.5 
337.7 
ns 22.6 
-133.1 
** 279.6 
109.3 
** 12.6 
16.9 
ns 9.95 
6.93 
ns 0.09 
0.37 
** 0.026 
0.204 
* 
2001: Profit 
           Losses 
36 
392 
4.06 
3.10 
1,207.1 
374.6 
** 255.6 
160.2 
ns 20.0 
-169.8 
** 267.7 
133.6 
** 14.2 
20.7 
ns 7.35 
5.10 
ns 0.081 
0.439 
ns 0.022 
0.064 
ns 
2002: Profit 
           Losses 
54 
313 
4.49 
4.14 
1,001.2 
220.2 
** 288.9 
130.4 
** 24.6 
-98.6 
** 256.7 
136.0 
* 14.3 
19.1 
ns 10.6 
3.3 
** 0.082 
0.387 
* 0.026 
0.029 
ns 
2003: Profit 
           Losses 
101 
206 
5.49 
5.19 
1,798.7 
306.1 
** 301.5 
89.3 
** 29.3 
-41.8 
** 315.7 
113.8 
** 21.1 
15.9 
ns 9.94 
1.83 
** 0.09 
0.69 
ns 0.015 
0.014 
ns 
Panel:  Profit 
Data  Losses             
475 
1924 
4.28 
4.57 
1,586.7 
740.64 
** 211.3 
174.6 
ns 20.4 
-96.9 
** 235.4 
118.1 
** 13.0 
14.8 
ns 6.57 
4.34 
** 
 
0.093 
0.633 
* 0.022 
0.133 
** 
† - T-statistics testing for a difference in means (assumed unequal variance). N is the number of firms in which group. (**) and (*) identify differences statistically significant 
at on 1% and 5% respectively. (ns) denotes a difference that is not statistically significant. For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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PANEL B: Medians† 
          Variables 
 
Period 
N Age MVE  BVE  NI_BE  Sales  RD  ADV  R&D/ 
Sales 
 Adv/ 
Sales 
 
1996: Profit 
          Losses 
34 
37 
1 
1 
272.05 
105.19 
** 59.23 
21.02 
** 5.10 
-8.45 
** 71.24 
10.18 
** 4.27 
1.96 
Ns 0.00 
0.00 
ns 0.022 
0.234 
** 0.000 
0.000 
ns 
1997: Profit 
          Losses 
49 
66 
2 
2 
229.27 
111.54 
** 49.55 
18.27 
** 4.92 
-10.78 
** 80.19 
16.90 
** 0 
1.23 
Ns 0.00 
0.00 
ns 0.000 
0.193 
** 0.000 
0.000 
ns 
1998: Profit 
          Losses 
47 
107 
2 
2 
251.19 
168.71 
ns 48.87 
42.47 
ns 7.67 
-11.29 
** 106.1 
22.31 
** 0.2 
1.13 
Ns 0.00 
0.00 
ns 0.003 
0.123 
** 0.000 
0.000 
ns 
1999: Profit 
          Losses 
80 
350 
1 
2 
825.89 
678.28 
ns 93.10 
56.00 
** 7.09 
-19.35 
** 102.7 
21.28 
** 2.00 
2.34 
Ns 0.00 
0.09 
ns 0.011 
0.161 
** 0.000 
0.005 
** 
2000: Profit 
          Losses 
74 
453 
2 
2 
249.93 
100.74 
** 116.9 
84.95 
* 8.83 
-36.47 
** 129.2 
39.87 
** 4.96 
6.63 
ns 0.00 
0.38 
ns6) 0.069 
0.200 
** 0.000 
0.014 
** 
2001: Profit 
          Losses 
36 
392 
3 
3 
459.78 
76.69 
** 119.7 
56.65 
* 7.49 
-40.65 
** 136.3 
47.96 
** 5.14 
7.76 
ns 0.03 
0.27 
ns 0.036 
0.198 
** 0.001 
0.006 
ns 
2002: Profit 
          Losses 
54 
313 
4 
4 
261.74 
52.73 
** 69.77 
41.63 
** 10.87 
-20.13 
** 107.8 
48.62 
** 2.79 
6.38 
ns 0.04 
0.06 
ns 0.027 
0.184 
** 0.001 
0.002 
ns 
2003: : Profit 
          Losses 
101 
206 
5 
5 
461.24 
107.37 
** 100.7 
23.92 
** 10.32 
-12.09 
** 104.3 
43.53 
** 5.77 
4.73 
ns 0.04 
0.00 
ns 0.080 
0.182 
** 0.001 
0.000 
ns 
Panel:  Profit 
Data   Losses            
475 
1924 
4 
4 
368.29 
128.40 
** 81.63 
48.63 
** 7.42 
-24.29 
** 98.53 
33.75 
** 3.56 
4.89 
ns 0.01 
0.06 
** 0.033 
0.185 
** 0.000 
0.002 
** 
† Z- Statistics on Wilcoxon 2-sample rank sums test for a difference in medians (normal approximation). N is the number of firms in which group. (**) and (*) identify differences 
statistically significant at on 1% and 5% respectively. (ns) denotes a difference that is not statistically significant. For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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TABLE 6 
Differences between means and medians in non net firms sample: profits firms and losses firms (the variables are in millions of dollars, unless ratios)  
PANEL A: Means† 
           Variables 
 
Period 
N Age MVE  BVE  NI_BE  Sales  RD  ADV  R&D/ 
Sales 
 Adv/ 
Sales 
 
1996: Profit 
          Losses 
81 
62 
2,17 
1,76 
214,06 
131,55 
 59,18 
43,70 
 7,36 
-7,11 
*
* 
114,1 
64,27 
* 4,8 
5,36 
 0,46 
0,50 
 0,07 
0,84 
* 0,004 
0,03 
* 
1997: Profit 
          Losses 
109 
82 
2,36 
2,41 
307,54 
175,83 
 70,05 
37,58 
** 8,80 
-13,7 
*
* 
256,0 
48,67 
** 4,9 
6,25 
 0,30 
0,60 
 0,06 
6,51 
 0,003 
0,017 
* 
1998: Profit 
          Losses 
120 
92 
3,09 
2,83 
452,59 
126,73 
* 92,19 
40,11 
** 12,71 
-17,13 
*
* 
200,5 
41,4 
** 5,81 
8,23 
 0,82 
0,41 
 0,04 
13,38 
 0,004 
0,171 
 
1999: Profit 
          Losses 
182 
174 
2,72 
2,44 
441,34 
803,44 
* 86,50 
107,2 
 10,48 
-23,44 
*
* 
174,7 
86,36 
** 4,83 
7,8 
* 0,94 
0,87 
 0,05 
1,63 
 0,005 
0,40 
 
2000: Profit 
          Losses 
195 
250 
3,30 
2,55 
494,29 
443,74 
 111,5 
156,4 
 13,93 
-51,52 
*
* 
214,8 
105,4 
** 6,85 
13,0 
** 1,02 
1,23 
 0,05 
2,2 
** 0,005 
0,08 
 
2001: Profit 
          Losses 
140 
262 
4,35 
3,61 
607,92 
339,06 
** 146,7 
161,7 
 14,26 
-64,55 
*
* 
243,8 
139,3 
** 11,2 
17,9 
* 1,51 
0,92 
 0,07 
1,87 
** 0,006 
0,012 
 
2002: Profit 
          Losses 
145 
229 
5,49 
4,52 
378,91 
170,60 
** 157,7 
132,4 
 16,75 
-65,94 
*
* 
292,1 
141,4 
** 9,81 
20,4 
** 1,76 
1,18 
 0,06 
1,63 
** 0,006 
0,018 
 
2003: Profit 
          Losses 
146 
190 
5,18 
5,24 
684,32 
306,77 
** 230,2 
100,6 
** 23,91 
-37,56 
*
* 
357,9 
145,2 
** 15,0 
19,7 
** 38,3 
1,64 
 0,06 
1,67 
* 0,137 
0,013 
 
Panel:  Profit 
Data : Losses 
1118 
1341 
4,28 
4,98 
466,77 
351,35 
** 123,4 
118,6 
 13,97 
-44,18 
*
* 
 
225,8 
111,6 
** 8,16 
14,4 
** 5,9 
1,04 
 0,06 
2,88 
** 0,022 
0,089 
 
† - T-statistics testing for a difference in means (assumed unequal variance). N is the number of firms in which group. (**) and (*) identify differences statistically significant at on 
1% and 5% respectively. (ns) denotes a difference that is not statistically significant. For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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PANEL B: Medians† 
           Variables 
 
Period 
N Age MVE  BVE  NI_BE  Sales  RD  ADV  R&D/ 
Sales 
 Adv/ 
Sales 
 
1996: Profit 
          Losses 
81 
62 
2 
1 
123,01 
66,13 
*
* 
38,5 
23,88 
** 4,79 
-3.83 
** 59,53 
16,28 
** 0,51 
0,62 
 0 
0 
 0,018 
0,044 
 0 
0 
 
1997: Profit 
          Losses 
109 
82 
2 
2 
126,59 
58,22 
*
* 
45,89 
23,01 
** 4,19 
-6,19 
** 77,24 
18,33 
** 0,05 
2,67 
* 0 
0 
 0,0004 
0,125 
** 0 
0 
 
1998: Profit 
          Losses 
120 
92 
2 
3 
102,08 
50,19 
*
* 
52,45 
25,69 
** 5,71 
-7,45 
** 94,98 
27,2 
** 0 
4,31 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,14 
** 0 
0 
 
1999: Profit 
          Losses 
182 
174 
2 
2 
142,6 
163,75 
 57,41 
37,89 
** 5,84 
-10,08 
** 88,49 
24,82 
** 0 
2,34 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,11 
** 0 
0 
 
2000: Profit 
          Losses 
195 
250 
2,5 
2 
151,76 
149,13 
 72,52 
74,94 
 7,03 
-18,61 
** 115,8 
32,56 
** 0 
7,18 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,189 
** 0 
0 
 
2001: Profit 
          Losses 
140 
262 
4 
3 
246,41 
120,25 
*
* 
116,7 
63,75 
** 8,44 
-20,36 
** 131,0 
38,34 
** 0 
8,61 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,184 
** 0 
0 
 
2002: Profit 
          Losses 
145 
229 
5 
4 
158,98 
70,92 
*
* 
96,97 
50,11 
** 7,02 
-22,26 
** 124,2 
39,3 
** 0 
10,2 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,212 
** 0 
0 
 
2003: Profit 
          Losses 
146 
190 
5 
4 
297,79 
134,46 
*
* 
147,2 
48,82 
** 9,48 
-14,9 
** 152,1 
48,13 
** 0 
8,41 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,196 
** 0 
0 
 
Panel: Profit 
Data: Lossess 
1118 
1341 
4 
4 
158,0 
101,66 
*
* 
67,38 
46,95 
** 6,32 
-14,67 
** 103,8 
33,53 
** 0 
5,81 
** 0 
0 
 0 
0,176 
** 0 
0 
 
† Z- Statistics on Wilcoxon 2-sample rank sums test for a difference in medians (normal approximation). N is the number of firms in which group. (**) and (*) identify differences 
statistically significant at on 1% and 5% respectively. (ns) denotes a difference that is not statistically significant. For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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Table 7 
Changes over time of the principal characteristics of net firms sample set 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Trend 
Sig. 
Number of 
sample firms 
 71 115 154 430 527 428 367 307  
Age: Mean 
Median 
1,65 
1,00 
2,06 
2,00 
2,40 
2 
1,81 
1,00 
2,28 
2,00 
3,18 
3,00 
4,19 
4,00 
5,29 
5,00 
*** 
** 
Sales Mean 
Median 
111,16 
26,76 
104,9
0 
35,25 
102,82 
38,09 
87,65 
26,20 
133,20 
46,87 
144,86 
52,04 
153,77 
56,52 
180,22 
65,50 
** 
*** 
Assets Mean 
Median 
118,42 
52,90 
143,5
1 
57,54 
161,67 
60,13 
299,25 
86,27 
551,33 
127,82 
342,67 
91.39 
352,20 
95,55 
408,18 
90,76 
** 
* 
NI_BE Mean 
Median 
-2,37 
-0,83 
-6,33 
-3,07 
-15,04 
-5,53 
-31,07 
-13,65 
-
111,20 
-28,76 
-153,85 
-34,91 
-80,56 
-15,23 
-18,44 
-4,73 
 
LT Mean 
Median 
62,57 
9,88 
79,64 
12,56 
89,61 
14,20 
136,31 
16,04 
211,45 
25,37 
171,32 
24,33 
195,27 
26,08 
245,97 
28,36 
*** 
*** 
LTD Mean 
Median 
20,42 
0,16 
30,26 
0,21 
35,75 
0.10 
58,29 
0.36 
73,55 
0.29 
51,44 
0,13 
43,18 
0,05 
42,08 
0,05 
 
RD Mean 
Median 
4,57 
3,08 
6,25 
1,15 
7,92 
1,13 
7,20 
2,34 
16,30 
6,43 
20,12 
7,65 
18,38 
6,05 
17,65 
5,20 
** 
** 
ADV Mean 
Median 
0,45 
0,00 
1,37 
0,00 
2,28 
0,00 
4,32 
0,00 
7,29 
0,33 
5,29 
0,26 
4,34 
0,06 
4,50 
0,00 
* 
BVE Mean 
Median 
55,22 
31,22 
61,46 
35,56 
70,24 
37,75 
151,61 
60,41 
326,75 
90,47 
168,22 
58,73 
153,76 
47,49 
159,12 
47,70 
 
MVE/BVE Mean 
Median 
5,54 
4,64 
6,33 
4,62 
8,08 
5,32 
16,70 
11,39 
2,21 
1,25 
2,64 
1,47 
2,18 
1,42 
5,01 
3,40 
 
LT/ 
Assets 
Mean 
Median 
0.53 
0,19 
0,55 
0,22 
0,55 
0,24 
0,46 
0,19 
0,38 
0,20 
0,50 
0,27 
0,55 
0,27 
0,60 
0,32 
 
** 
RD/ Sales Mean 
Median 
0,04 
0,12 
0,06 
0,03 
0,08 
0,03 
0,08 
0,10 
0,12 
0,14 
0,14 
0,15 
0,12 
0,11 
0,10 
0,08 
** 
ADV/SALES Mean 
Median 
0,004 
0,00 
0,013 
0,00 
0,0222 
0,00 
0,0493 
0,00 
0,0548 
0,007 
0,0365 
0,005 
0,0282 
0,001 
0,025 
0,000 
 
We test the significance of the changes over time by regressing each characteristics on annual time trend, and report, in the last column, the significance of the coefficient estimated 
for t. We use OLS to test trend in means and medians regressions. 
Notes: The variables are in millions of dollars unless ratios. Age is the number of the years of the firm after go public. For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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Table 8 
Changes over time of the principal characteristics of non net firms sample set 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Trend 
Sig. 
Number of 
sample firms 
 143 191 212 356 445 402 374 336  
Age: Mean 
Median 
1,99 
1,00 
2,38 
2,00 
2,98 
3,00 
2,59 
2,00 
2,87 
2,00 
3,86 
3,00 
4,89 
4,00 
5.,21 
4,00 
*** 
*** 
Sales Mean 
Median 
92,47 
41,41 
109,9
4 
44,.36 
131,44 
60,31 
131,53 
55,57 
153,32 
56,47 
175,67 
64,23 
199,78 
67,97 
237,63 
82,42 
*** 
*** 
Assets Mean 
Median 
111,38 
49,51 
130,0
5 
59,84 
199,55 
81,89 
291,07 
93,63 
356,36 
122,87 
397,74 
137,20 
409,51 
146,69 
466,69 
159,55 
*** 
*** 
NI_BE Mean 
Median 
1,08 
0,92 
-0.86 
0,85 
-0.24 
1,50 
-6,10 
0,25 
-22,84 
-2,49 
-37,11 
-5,67 
-33,88 
-3,04 
-10,85 
-1,69 
** 
** 
LT Mean 
Median 
58,15 
12,38 
72,72 
17,73 
127,88 
25,48 
187,58 
27,88 
208,77 
29,27 
235,91 
31,15 
261,85 
34,12 
306,06 
41,83 
*** 
*** 
LTD Mean 
Median 
21,85 
0.56 
23,52 
0,97 
36,77 
1,45 
88,00 
1,76 
109,67 
1,18 
132,32 
0,98 
152,95 
1,41 
177,12 
0,91 
*** 
RD Mean 
Median 
5,05 
0.51 
5,48 
0.96 
6,86 
0.004 
6,28 
0,00 
10,28 
2,44 
15,57 
4,81 
16,20 
5,20 
17,66 
4,01 
*** 
** 
ADV Mean 
Median 
0,48 
0,00 
0,43 
0,00 
0,64 
0,00 
0,91 
0,00 
1,14 
0,00 
1,12 
0,00 
1,40 
0,00 
17,58 
0,00 
* 
BVE Mean 
Median 
52,47 
33,78 
56,11 
37,43 
69,59 
44,35 
96,61 
60,66 
136,76 
73,20 
156,49 
73,18 
142,20 
66,84 
156,89 
74,39 
*** 
*** 
MVE/BVE Mean 
Median 
3,40 
2,77 
4,47 
2,76 
4,47 
1,99 
6,40 
2,95 
3,41 
2,04 
2,77 
2,05 
1,77 
1,35 
3,00 
2,71 
 
LT/ 
Assets 
Mean 
Median 
0,52 
0,25 
0,56 
0,30 
0,64 
0,31 
0,64 
0,30 
0,59 
0,24 
0,59 
0,23 
0,64 
0,23 
0,66 
0,26 
** 
RD/ Sales Mean 
Median 
0,055 
0,012 
0,05 
0,022 
0,0522 
0,0001 
0,0478 
0,000 
0,067 
0,0431 
0,0886 
0,0749 
0,0811 
0,0765 
0,0743 
0,0487 
** 
** 
ADV/SALES Mean 
Median 
0,005 
0,000 
0,004 
0,000 
0,005 
0,000 
0,007 
0,000 
0,007 
0,000 
0,006 
0,000 
0,007 
0,000 
0,074 
0,000 
 
We test the significance of the changes over time by regressing each characteristics on annual time trend, and report, in the last column, the significance of the coefficient estimated 
for t. We use OLS to test trend in means and medians regressions. 
Notes: The variables are in millions of dollars unless ratios. Age is the number of the years of the firm after go public. For definition of the variables, see appendix A. 
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TABLE 9  
Regressions for hypothesis 1: net firms sample set 
             Profit group Loss group 
Year N Intercept NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
N Intercept NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
1996 34 
(2) 
5,05*** 
(28,20) 
0,05*** 
(5,215) 
44,26  37 
(0) 
4,08*** 
(17,195) 
-0.026*** 
(-3,838) 
16,23 
1997 49 
(1) 
5,06*** 
(30,462) 
0,037*** 
(5,781) 
40,31  66 
(0) 
3,94*** 
(16,762) 
-0.022*** 
(-2,978) 
19,85 
1998 47 
(1) 
4,84*** 
(21,714) 
0,047*** 
(4,268) 
27,24  107 
(4) 
4,67*** 
(25,452) 
-0.014*** 
(-4,351) 
14,47 
1999 80 
(5) 
6,44*** 
(31,475) 
0,02*** 
(3,532) 
12,68  350 
(16) 
6,19*** 
(59,44) 
-0.005*** 
(-4,227) 
6,94 
2000 74 
(2) 
5,08*** 
(25,246) 
0,022*** 
(4,859) 
20,83  453 
(3) 
4,42*** 
(45,728) 
-0.002*** 
(-4,065) 
9,81 
2001 36 
(1) 
5,40*** 
(21,72) 
0,027*** 
(4,264) 
32,93  392 
(10) 
4,15*** 
(39,645) 
-0.001*** 
(-5,484) 
8,20 
2002 54 
(5) 
4,61*** 
(18,276) 
0,03*** 
(5,468) 
35,29  313 
(12) 
3,69*** 
(34,438) 
-0.002*** 
(-3,318) 
8,42 
2003 101 
(5) 
5,50*** 
(37,112) 
0,017*** 
(7,647) 
36,50  206 
(15) 
4,07*** 
(30,818) 
-0.007*** 
(-5,43) 
12,20 
Mean  5,25*** 0,031*** 31,25   4,402*** -0.01** 12,02 
t-statistic  26,545 7,087   15,93 -2.859  
Model estimate: itetiBENIitMVE ++= ,_10 αα , where MVE is the market value of equity and NI_BE the net income before 
extraordinary items. In first column of each group we report in parenthesis the number of firms with negative BVE. The 
regressions are run for each year using all firms for the year on all variables in the model. T-Statistics for all years are in 
parenthesis. The last two rows show mean (across years) of the regressions intercepts and slopes and t-statistic. Tstatistic is a 
mean divided by its standard error (the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The 
standards errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) with 6 lags. *** and ** denote 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) respectively. 
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TABLE 10  
Regressions for hypothesis 1: non net firms sample set 
             Profit group Loss group 
Year N Intercept NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
N Intercept NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
1996 81 
(2) 
4,23*** 
(32,02) 
0,07** 
(7,065) 
40,20 62 
(3) 
3,46*** 
(17,761) 
-0.078*** 
(-4,844) 
26,90 
1997 109 
(5) 
4,62*** 
(37,216) 
0,033*** 
(3,107) 
26,37 82 
(2) 
3,72*** 
(17,725) 
-0.015 
(-1,647) 
5,30 
1998 120 
(0) 
4,43*** 
(42,447) 
0,034*** 
(9,499) 
42,85 92 
(1) 
3,84*** 
(22,658) 
-0.005 
(-1.301) 
1,00 
1999 182 
(5) 
4,52*** 
(35,439) 
0,051*** 
(5.772) 
25,34 174 
(9) 
4,74*** 
(25,706) 
-0.012** 
(-2.124) 
9,00 
2000 195 
(6) 
4,18*** 
(31,46) 
0,058*** 
(8.699) 
38,14 250 
(6) 
4,52*** 
(32,028) 
-0.003** 
(-2.029) 
4,20 
2001 140 
(4) 
4,52*** 
(34,919) 
0,060*** 
(10,152) 
47,79 262 
(10) 
4,28*** 
(37,117) 
-0.004*** 
(-5.975) 
11,74 
2002 145 
(3) 
4,44*** 
(34,68) 
0,036*** 
(5,691) 
40,12 229 
(10) 
3,83*** 
(29,525) 
-0,002** 
(-2,201) 
5,70 
2003 146 
(4) 
5,09*** 
(39,077) 
0,023*** 
(5,700) 
36,52 190 
(12) 
4,34*** 
(31,365) 
-0,011*** 
(-5,122) 
18,54 
Mean  4,505*** 0,0456*** 37,17  4,09*** -0,016 10,30 
t-statistic  45,437 7,87   25,995 -1,832  
Model estimate: itetiBENIitMVE ++= ,_10 αα , where MVE is the market value of equity and NI_BE the net income 
before extraordinary items. In first column of each group, we report in parenthesis the number of firms with negative BVE. 
The regressions are run for each year using all firms for the year on all variables in the model. T-Statistics for all years are 
in parenthesis. The last two rows show mean (across years) of the regressions intercepts and slopes and t-statistic which is 
calculated divided the mean by its standard error (the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 
81/2). The standards errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) with 6 lags.*** and ** 
denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
Panel A: Matrix of correlations for hypothesis 2: net firms sample set 
Loss 
group 
(N=1924) 
MVE BVE NI NI_BE RD ADV Profit 
group 
(N=475) 
MVE BVE NI NI_BE RD ADV 
MVE 1 0.588** -0.3** -0.311** 0.327** 0.111** MVE 1 0.676** 0.627** 0.65** 0,407** 0.241** 
BVE 0.401** 1 -0.717** -0.699** 0.385** 0.190** BVE 0.482** 1 0.539** 0.585** 0,377** 0.193** 
NI -0.151** -0.666** 1 0.976** -0.323** -0.232** NI 0.381** 0.622** 1 0.967** 0.216** 0.174** 
NI_BE -0.155** -0.675** 0.99** 1 -0.321** -0.236** NI_BE 0.395** 0.715** 0.936** 1 0.217** 0.181** 
RD 0.262** 0.381** -0.379** -0.389** 1 0.132** RD 0.456** 0.537** 0.466** 0.490** 1 0.282** 
ADV 0.133** 0.152** -0.19** -0.192** 0.084** 1 ADV 0.507** 0.737** 0.590** 0.642** 0.526** 1 
 Numbers above the diagonal represent Pearson correlations, and below the diagonal Spearman rank correlations. 
 (**) and (*) Indicates significance at 1% and 5%, respectively 
 
Panel B: Matrix of correlations for hypothesis 2: Non net firms sample set 
Loss 
group 
(N=1341) 
MVE BVE NI NI_BE RD ADV Profit 
group 
(N=1118) 
MVE BVE NI NI_BE RD ADV 
MVE 1 0,714** -0,445** -0,473** 0,443** -0,09** MVE 1 0,732** 0,693** 0,700** 0,345** 0,031 
BVE 0,495** 1 -0,665** -0,651** 0,381** -0,065** BVE 0,515** 1 0,609** 0,632** 0,193** 0,051 
NI -0,183** -0,633** 1 0,962** -0,347** -0,015 NI 0,626** 0,508** 1 0,972** 0,102** 0,073** 
NI_BE -0,198** -0,628** 0,965** 1 -0,350** -0,021 NI_BE 0,678** 0,599** 0,892** 1 0,095** 0,072** 
RD 0,188** 0,390** -0,184** -0,183** 1 -
0,0133** 
RD 0,629** 0,519** 0,553** 0,599** 1 0,011 
ADV 0,098** 0,124** -0,384** -0,385** -0,039 1 ADV 0,003 0,019 0,022 0,023 -0,007 1 
 Numbers above the diagonal represent Pearson correlations, and below the diagonal Spearman rank correlations. 
 (**) and (*) Indicates significance at 1% and 5%, respectively 
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TABLE 12 
 Regressions for hypothesis 2: net firms sample set 
 Profit group Loss group 
Year N Intercept BVE NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
 N Intercept BVE NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
1996 34 
(2) 
5,03*** 
(27,07) 
0,0005 
(0,426) 
0,049*** 
(4,682) 
42,79  37 
(0) 
3,45*** 
(13,589) 
0,022*** 
(3,664) 
-0,007 
(-0,471) 
46,53 
1997 49 
(1) 
4,89*** 
(28,278) 
0,003** 
(2,424) 
0,032*** 
(4,96) 
45,92  66 
(0) 
3,79*** 
(16,799) 
0,006* 
(1,856) 
-0,012*** 
(-3,194) 
28,63 
1998 47 
(1) 
4,59*** 
(20,551) 
0,008*** 
(2,898) 
0,012 
(0,781) 
37,51  107 
(4) 
4,33*** 
(24,347) 
0,006*** 
(5,093) 
-0,008** 
(-2,533) 
30,88 
1999 80 
(5) 
6,17*** 
(28,276) 
0,0028** 
(2,412) 
0,001** 
(2,062) 
28,74  350 
(16) 
6,12*** 
(62,868) 
0,001*** 
(4,597) 
-0,004*** 
(-3,813) 
12,03 
2000 74 
(2) 
4,79*** 
(19,526) 
0,002*** 
(4,612) 
0,013*** 
(2,928) 
35,77  453 
(3) 
4,38*** 
(46,144) 
0,001*** 
(3,072) 
-0,0002 
(-0,59) 
16,80 
2001 36 
(1) 
5,23*** 
(21,683) 
0.002*** 
(2,534) 
0,016*** 
(2,237) 
42,15  392 
(10) 
3,92*** 
(35,277) 
0,002*** 
(3,937) 
0,001** 
(1,98) 
23,82 
2002 54 
(5) 
4,64*** 
(16,392) 
0,001** 
(2,221) 
0,016* 
(1,959) 
36,51  313 
(12) 
3,47*** 
(27,47) 
0,003*** 
(3,549) 
0,003** 
(2,423) 
24,91 
2003 101 
(5) 
5,50*** 
(34,726) 
0,0004 
(0,639) 
0,014** 
(2,195) 
36,74  206 
(15) 
3,94*** 
(30,24) 
0,004*** 
(7,214) 
0,002 
(1,176) 
29,54 
Mean2)  5,11 0,0024 0,02 38,27   4,174 0,005 -0,003 26,65 
t-statistic  27,364*** 2,897** 4,271***    13,795*** 2,21** -1,598  
Model estimate: itetiBENIitBVEitMVE ++−+= ,_2110 ααα , where MVE is the market value of equity, BVE the book value of equity and NI_BE the net income before extraordinary 
items. In first column of each group, we report in parenthesis the number of firms with negative BVE. The regressions are run for each year using all firms for the year on all variables in 
the model. T-Statistics for all years are in parenthesis. The last two rows show mean (across years) of the regressions intercepts and slopes and t-statistic which is calculated divided the 
mean by its standard error (the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The standards errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New 
and West (1987) with 6 lags. *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) respectively.*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) 
respectively. 
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TABLE 13 
 Regressions for hypothesis 2: non net firms sample set 
 Profit group Loss group 
Year N Intercept BVE NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
N Intercept BVE NI_BE Adj. R2 
(%) 
1996 81 
(2) 
3,94*** 
(34,521) 
0,011*** 
(5,381) 
0,0354*** 
(3,412) 
55,83 62 
(3) 
3,23*** 
(19,331) 
0,014*** 
(5,328) 
-0,008 
(-0,422) 
49,82 
1997 109 
(5) 
4,19*** 
(37,474) 
0,011*** 
(6,706) 
0,003 
(0,455) 
47,80 82 
(2) 
3,30*** 
(13,147) 
0,016*** 
(3,271) 
0,012 
(1,45) 
35 
1998 120 
(0) 
4,17*** 
(34,661) 
0,006*** 
(3,058) 
0,018*** 
(3,058) 
50,28 92 
(1) 
2,87*** 
(16,749) 
0,023*** 
(8,422) 
0,014*** 
(3,586) 
44,15 
1999 182 
(5) 
4,39*** 
(32,935) 
0,003*** 
(3,179) 
0,04*** 
(4,185) 
29,06 174 
(9) 
4,51*** 
(25,981) 
0,003*** 
(2,592) 
-0,008** 
(-2,212) 
22,18 
2000 195 
(6) 
3,95*** 
(28,511) 
0,005*** 
(3,615) 
0,039*** 
(4,794) 
44,07 250 
(6) 
4,22*** 
(28,183) 
0,002*** 
(5,09) 
-0,0001 
(-0,094) 
20,46 
2001 140 
(4) 
4,35*** 
(36,488) 
0,003*** 
(4.,199) 
0,046*** 
(11,236) 
54,20 262 
(10) 
4,08*** 
(34,220) 
0,003*** 
(6,199) 
0,020** 
(2,464) 
28,54 
2002 145 
(3) 
4,25*** 
(33,963) 
0,003*** 
(3,339) 
0,025*** 
(4,034) 
48,89 229 
(10) 
3,52*** 
(29,332) 
0,003*** 
(6,062) 
0,002*** 
(2,85) 
25,74 
2003 146 
(4) 
4,94*** 
(36,664) 
0,002*** 
(4,827) 
0,016*** 
(3,532) 
44,21 190 
(12) 
4,12*** 
(31,341) 
0,002*** 
(5,059) 
-0,005*** 
(-2,65) 
29,22 
Mean2)  4,274*** 0,005*** 0,028*** 46,79  3,74*** 0,008** 0,003 31,89 
t-statistics  38,181 4,117 5,235   17,993 2,841 0,867  
Model estimate: itetiBENIitBVEitMVE ++−+= ,_2110 ααα , where MVE is the market value of equity, BVE the book value of equity and NI_BE the net income 
before extraordinary items In first column of each group, we report in parenthesis the number of firms with negative BVE. The regressions are run for each year using 
all firms for the year on all variables in the model. T-Statistics for all years are in parenthesis. The last two rows show mean (across years) of the regressions intercepts 
and slopes and t-statistic which is calculated divided the mean by its standard error (the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The 
standards errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) with 6 lags.*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) 
respectively. 
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TABLE 14 
 Regressions for hypothesis 3: net firms sample set 
 Profit group Loss group 
Year N Intercept BVE NIB_RD RD Adj. R2 
(%) 
N Intercept BVE NIB_RD RD Adj. R2 
(%) 
1996 34 
(2) 
4,92*** 
(25,492) 
-0.0006 
(-0,489) 
0.044*** 
(4,106) 
0.006 
(0,176) 
45,95 37 
(0) 
3,45*** 
(15,337) 
0,022*** 
(4,306) 
-0,007 
(-0,78) 
0,002 
(0,091) 
44,97 
1997 49 
(1) 
4,88*** 
(29,03) 
0.007 
(1,268) 
0.03*** 
(4,674) 
-0.011 
(-0,898) 
49,16 66 
(0) 
3,68*** 
(15,772) 
0,005 
(1,508) 
-0,011*** 
(-3,741) 
0,047** 
(2,69) 
31,59 
1998 40 
(1) 
4,69*** 
(19,822) 
0.007** 
(2,561) 
0.019 
(0,856) 
-0.022 
(-0,633) 
39,23 89 
(4) 
4,24*** 
(21,303) 
0,005*** 
(3,325) 
-0,008** 
(-2,078) 
0,023*** 
(2,213) 
29,53 
1999 64 
(3) 
5,94*** 
(26,163) 
0.0067*** 
(4,128) 
-0.006 
(-0,884) 
0.018* 
(1,822) 
35,74 258 
(11) 
6,11*** 
(44,344) 
0,001*** 
(3,763) 
-0,002 
(-1,424) 
0,038*** 
(3,566) 
18,14 
2000 59 
(1) 
4,51*** 
(15,135) 
0.003*** 
(3,44) 
0.007* 
(1,869) 
0.018 
(1,045) 
34,96 343 
(1) 
4,53*** 
(41,304) 
0,0004*** 
(2,864) 
-0,0002 
(-0,518) 
0,007** 
(2,047) 
21,74 
2001 36 
(1) 
5,15*** 
(21,636) 
0.001 
(1,016) 
0.019** 
(2,603) 
-0.003 
(-0,324) 
45,30 314 
(6) 
4,07*** 
(30,274) 
0,001*** 
(3,539) 
0,001** 
(2,558) 
0,006 
(0,994) 
25,24 
2002 44 
(3) 
4,61*** 
(17,597) 
0.002 
(1,364) 
0.026** 
(2,276) 
-0.024 
(-1,349) 
36,29 265 
(8) 
3,43*** 
(27,025) 
0,002*** 
(4,133) 
0,004*** 
(3,923) 
0,009 
(1,551) 
30,27 
2003 88 
(4) 
5,39*** 
(39,851) 
0.0002 
(0,576) 
0.011** 
(2,475) 
0.002 
(0,371) 
46,77 183 
(13) 
3,96*** 
(31,341) 
0,004*** 
(6,636) 
0,003 
(1,316) 
-0,003 
(-0,948) 
30,68 
Mean  5,011*** 0.0032** 0.019** -0.002 41,68  4,183*** 0,005** -0,002 0,016** 29,02 
t-statistic  29,89 2.853 3.497 -0.362   13,681 2,019 -1,288 2,52  
Notes: Notes: Model estimate: iteitRDitRDNIBtiBVEitMVE +++−+= 3_21,10 αααα , where MVE is the market value of equity, BVE the book value of equity, 
NIB_RD the net income before research expenses and RD the research expenses In first column of each group, we report in parenthesis the number of firms with 
negative BVE. The regressions are run for each year using all firms for the year on all variables in the model. T-Statistics for all years are in parenthesis. The last two 
rows show mean (across years) of the regressions intercepts and slopes and t-statistic which is calculated divided the mean by its standard error (the time-series 
standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The standards errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) with 6 
lags.*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) respectively.  
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TABLE 15 
 Regressions for hypothesis 3: non net firms sample set 
 Profit group – B2B sub-sample Loss group - B2B sub-sample 
Year N Intercept BVE NIB_RD RD Adj. R2 
(%) 
N Intercept BVE NIB_RD RD Adj. R2 
(%) 
1996 81 
(2) 
3,93*** 
(33,04) 
0,011*** 
(5,359) 
0,039*** 
(2,784) 
-0,04* 
(-1,946) 
55,32 62 
(3) 
3,15*** 
(18,704) 
0,014*** 
(5,462) 
0,004 
(0,206) 
0,025 
(1,212) 
51,78 
1997 109 
(5) 
4,19*** 
(37,616) 
0,011*** 
(5,894) 
0,0005 
(0,078) 
0,014 
(0,984) 
48,19 82 
(2) 
3,08*** 
(11,332) 
0,015*** 
(3,1) 
0,013 
(1,646) 
0,029* 
(1,866) 
39,75 
1998 120 
(0) 
4,17*** 
(37,27) 
0,006*** 
(4,473) 
0,01* 
(1,713) 
0,007 
(0,64) 
52,67 92 
(1) 
2,69*** 
(15,966) 
0,019*** 
(6,834) 
0,01*** 
(2,819) 
0,031** 
(2,357) 
50,53 
1999 157 
(4) 
4,42*** 
(30,923) 
0,003* 
(1,907) 
0,024** 
(2,088) 
0,0001 
(0,004) 
32,56 155 
(9) 
4,25*** 
(25,833) 
0,001*** 
(2,705) 
-0,017*** 
(-3,812) 
0,053*** 
(5,472) 
28,00 
2000 173 
(5) 
4,00*** 
(26,887) 
0,005*** 
(3,313) 
0,031*** 
(3,931) 
-0,022* 
(-1,853) 
44,44 214 
(5) 
3,95*** 
(23,626) 
0,002*** 
(4,78) 
-0,0002 
(-0,410) 
0,033*** 
(4,753) 
30,96 
2001 59 
(1) 
4,94*** 
(31,769) 
0,001 
(1,139) 
0,034*** 
(4,801) 
-0,025*** 
(-2,334) 
61,02 183 
(6) 
4,1*** 
(24,858) 
0,002*** 
(2,806) 
0,002 
(0,002) 
0,019*** 
(3,772) 
38,88 
2002 56 
(1) 
4,67*** 
(35,867) 
0,002*** 
(3,361) 
0,012* 
(1,813) 
-0,005 
(-0,473) 
59,10 164 
(5) 
3,38*** 
(26,556) 
0,001** 
(1,902) 
0,001 
(0,884) 
0,025*** 
(5,960) 
42,28 
2003 60 
(3) 
5,29*** 
(31,663) 
0,001*** 
(2,501) 
0,002 
(0,397) 
0,007 
(0,844) 
45,64 139 
(5) 
4,35*** 
(37,03) 
0,001*** 
(2,916) 
-0,0004 
(-0,175) 
0,016*** 
(4,373) 
38,23 
Mean  4,452*** 0,005** 0,019** -0,008 49,87  3,619*** 0,007** 0,002 0,029*** 40,05 
t-statistics  26,279 3,523 3,618 -1,12   16,506 2,533 0,471 7,075  
 Model estimate: iteitRDitRDNIBtiBVEitMVE +++−+= 3_21,10 αααα , where MVE is the market value of equity, BVE the book value of equity, NIB_RD the 
net income before research expenses and RD the research expenses. In first column of each group, we report in parenthesis the number of firms with negative 
BVE. The regressions are run for each year using all firms for the year on all variables in the model. T-Statistics for all years are in parenthesis. The last two rows 
show mean (across years) of the regressions intercepts and slopes and t-statistic which is calculated divided the mean by its standard error (the time-series 
standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The standards errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) 
with 6 lags.*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) respectively.  
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TABLE 16 
 Regressions for hypothesis 3 
Year Profit group Loss group – B2C sub-sample 
 N N Intercept BVE NIB_ADV ADV Adj. R2 
(%) 
1998 7 18 
(0) 
4,28*** 
(11,377) 
0,006*** 
(4,756) 
-0,003 
(-1,229) 
0,06*** 
(5,033) 
56,64 
1999 16 
(2) 
92 
(5) 
5,28*** 
(27,533) 
0,004*** 
(4,352 
-0,002 
(-0,932) 
0,008 
(0,83) 
27,04 
2000 15 
(1) 
110 
(2) 
3,15*** 
(16,983 
0,001** 
(2,289) 
0,0004 
(1,398) 
0,018*** 
(4,673) 
27,23 
2001 0 78 
(4) 
2,85*** 
(12,123 
0,003*** 
(3,598) 
0,0021** 
(2,046) 
0,019*** 
(3,221) 
42,54 
2002 10 
(2) 
48 
(4 
2,75*** 
(9,764) 
0,004*** 
(4,251) 
0,003 
(0,943) 
0,012 
(1,354)) 
40,10 
2003 13 
(1) 
23 
(2) 
3,41*** 
(8,377) 
-0,0002 
(-0,0002) 
-0,013 
(-1,927) 
0,038*** 
(3,344) 
28,47 
Mean   3,618*** 0,003* -0,002 0,026* 37,00 
t-statistics   5,417 3,218 -0,837 3,07  
Notes: Notes: Model estimate: iteitADVitADVNIBtiBVEitMVE +++−+= 3_21,10 αααα , where MVE is the market value of equity, BVE the book value of equity, 
NIB_ADV the net income before advertising expenses and ADV the research expenses. In parenthesis we report the number of firms with negative BVE at the 
end of the year. T-statistics is a mean divided by its standard error (the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The standards 
errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) with 6 lags. *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) 
respectively.  
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TABLE 17 
 Regressions for hypothesis 3: non net firms sample set 
 Profit group - B2C sub-sample Loss group - B2C sub-sample 
Year N Intercept BVE NIB_ADV ADV Adj. R2 
(%) 
N Intercept BVE NIB_ADV ADV Adj. R2 
(%) 
1999 25 
(1) 
4,01*** 
(8,767) 
-0,0001 
(-0,016) 
0,08*** 
(4,0) 
-0,056 
(-1,07) 
34,4 19 
(0) 
2,92*** 
(4,285) 
0,006*** 
(4,426) 
-0,004 
(-0,885) 
0,071 
(1,074) 
53,82 
2000 22 
(1) 
3,11*** 
(9,844) 
-0,001 
(-0,032) 
0,13*** 
(6,853) 
-0,151*** 
(-5,04) 
72,21 36 
(1) 
2,76*** 
(8,104) 
0,003*** 
(3,854) 
-0,001 
(-0,515) 
0,055** 
(2,305) 
39,25 
2001 81 
(3) 
3,80*** 
(22,965) 
0,005*** 
(3,79) 
0,052*** 
(5,359) 
-0,052** 
(-2,285) 
52,94 79 
(4) 
3,18*** 
(13,981) 
0,003*** 
(2,711) 
0,001 
(1,077) 
0,09*** 
(2,963) 
34,20 
2002 89 
(2) 
3,77*** 
(23,703) 
0,003*** 
(4,015) 
0,039*** 
(5,077) 
-0,016 
(-0,819) 
52,79 65 
(5) 
2,55*** 
(8,73) 
0,007*** 
(4,105) 
0,009*** 
(3,085) 
0,071** 
(2,408) 
34,96 
2003 86 
(1) 
4,49*** 
(31,428) 
0,002*** 
(4,055) 
0,021*** 
(4,9) 
-0,021*** 
(-4,852) 
52,43 51 
(7) 
3,48*** 
(12,614) 
0,003*** 
(2,368) 
-0,004 
(-0,672) 
0,03 
(1,005) 
30,53 
Mean  3,835*** 0,002** 0,065** -0,059** 52,95  2,98*** 0,004*** 0,0003 0,063*** 38,55 
t-statistics  21,778 2,242 4,3 -3,076   23,228 6,365 0,177 8,019  
Notes: Notes: Model estimate: iteitADVitADVNIBtiBVEitMVE +++−+= 3_21,10 αααα , where MVE is the market value of equity, BVE the book value of equity, 
NIB_ADV the net income before advertising expenses and ADV the research expenses. In parenthesis we report the number of firms with negative BVE at the 
end of the year. T-statistics is a mean divided by its standard error (the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by 81/2). The standards 
errors are corrected for autocorrelation by the method of New and West (1987) with 6 lags. *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) 
respectively. 
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Table 18: Test Chow for both samples (net an d non net firms) and groups (profit and loss making firms) 
   Net firms Non net firms 
   Profit Loss Profit Loss 
F-Statistic 
(Probability) 
H1 NI_BE 0,768248 
0,521975 
24,25478* 
0.0058  
0,768248 
0,5219750 
2,166920 
0,230372 
 H2 NI_BE 3,047133 
0,157026 
0,901509 
0,475130 
1,111436 
0,413179 
2,994498 
0,160353 
  BVE 1,168684 
0,398384   
2,976670 
0,225748 
1,08116 
0,421339 
0,901509 
0,475130 
 H3a NIB_RD 8,690417** 
0,03500 
0,316657 
0,745309 
1,278034 
0,372249 
1,003377 
0,443446 
  RD 0,332554 
0,735185 
2,016040 
0,248007 
2,002176 
0,249728 
2,413599 
0,205340 
  BVE 4,089877 
0,107856 
2,734522 
0,178446 
2,236636 
0,210745 
0,462926 
0,659413 
 H3b NIB_ADV1)  1.578882 
0,387765 
342,87320** 
0,038162 
0,212925 
0,837458 
  ADV1)  6,484058 
0,133617 
13,08531 
0,191845 
9,253719 
0,226412 
  BVE1)  8,085916 
0,110060 
48,8320 
0,100675 
0,193750 
0,848953 
1)  For these group,, due the small number of observations, it was not possible estimate the model. 
.*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-side) respectively. 
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Appendix A: List of variables 
Variable description Label Compustat annual data item 
Balance sheet   
“Property, plant and equipment – total net value” PPE 8 
“Current assets - total” CA 4 
“Receivables-total” REC 2 
 “Cash and equivalents” CASH 1 
“Current assets-others” AO 68 
“Assets – total ´” ASSETS 6 
 “Common equity –total” BVE 60 
“Retained earnings” RE 36 
“Long-term debt –total” LTD 9 
“Current liabilities-total” CL 5 
 “Liabilities-total” LT 181 
Income Statement   
“Depreciation and amortization” DEP 14 
“Selling, general, and administrative expense” SGA 189 
 “Cost of goods sold” COGS 41 
Advertising expenses” Adv 45 
“Research and development expenses” R&D 46 
“Special items” SPEC 17 
 “Income before extraordinary items – available for 
common”  
NI_BE 237 
“Net income (loss)” NI 172 
“Sales (net)” SALES 12 
Others   
“ Operating activities-net cash flows” CFO 308 
“Market value of equity” MVE MKVALF 
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